JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. For example, study after study has found that putting family income in the hands of mothers, rather than fathers, tends to increase the consumption of children, as noted in this journal in Lundberg and Pollak (1996). Yet the way such results are usually described might strike a noneconomist as exceedingly circumspect. Economists point out that these findings reject the "common preference" model of household decision making in favor of one with "independent decisionmaking spouses"-but usually make little mention of motherhood or fatherhood per se. Or consider the dramatic expansion of South African government pension programs in the early 1990s, which put lots of extra money in the hands of grandparents, many of whom lived with their grandchildren. In a compelling and oft-cited study, Duflo (2003) found evidence of pension spillovers to grandchildren. But the most intriguing patterns were demographic: pensions to maternal grandmothers redounded to the benefit of granddaughters. Economic analysis uncovers the income effects but turns out to be of little help for explaining why these particular gender effects predominated. 
shows how biological thinking can be applied to time preference, risk aversion, rationality, and more.
Despite these inroads, evolutionary biology still tends to be peripheral to economic studies of the family, and a closer look is clearly warranted. "Biofounded" approaches that explicitly consider sex differences in reproductive capabilities and constraints can illuminate corresponding differences in the goals and interests of men versus women regarding preferences for a mate, decisions to marry or to terminate a marriage, how much to invest in a relationship, how much to invest in children, and how much to value the quality relative to the quantity of children.
This paper explicates the oft-used "hub-and-spoke" format for generating biologically based hypotheses about family behavior. The hub is Hamilton's rule, which holds that the costs and benefits of altruistic acts are weighted by the closeness of the genetic relationship. The spokes emanate from various fundamentals of human reproductive biology. (For instance, a father might be uncertain of his genetic relationship to offspring, but a mother almost never is.) This arrangement generates a unified approach for modeling diverse aspects of family behavior. My discussion of these biological fundamentals will include applications, empirical illustrations, and suggestions for how to merge these basics with current economic thinking.
Hamilton's Rule
The biological basis for why one relative might make sacrifices on behalf of another has its origins in a puzzle that took over 100 years to solve. Charles Darwin argued that the living world is a select set of progeny whose ancestors managed to survive and reproduce. However, some phenomena, such as a honeybee's suicidal defense of its hive, seemed to contradict the Darwinian dictum. Hamilton's rule, proposed by biologist William D. Hamilton (1964) , is a straightforward but farreaching argument about the biological foundations for familial altruism. Hamilton focused on the gene rather than the individual. The honeybee's heroism could be optimal from the "gene's-eye view": though the altruist's genetic code is lost, even more of that same code can prevail within rescued relatives.
Imagine that my brother and I are soldiers and a sniper is aiming a grenade launcher at him. I can cry out, drawing deadly fire toward myself but saving him. The stakes? For any particular gene I have, there is a 50 percent chance that it came from my father and a 50 percent chance that it came from my mother. Since my brother has the same parents, there is a 50-50 chance that he will share any particular gene; to put it differently, my brother would be expected on average to match half of my genes.' Thus the expected benefit from calling out is that only 50 percent of my genes survive-best to keep silent! But if three brothers were imperiled, the benefits of saving them--150 percent of my genes in expected value--would outweigh the costs of sacrificing myself. Thus, from a gene's-eye view, an organism will issue a risky, even suicidal, warning cry if it rescues sufficient numbers of relatives of sufficient genetic closeness.
In more general terms, denote the cost of the altruistic act to the donor by C, and benefits of the act to the recipients by B. Let r denote the coefficient ofrelatedness, that is, the extent to which the donor and recipient share genes. Hamilton's rule stipulates that the donor provides help if rB> C.
In this example, B and C are counted in terms of lives saved. More generally, evolutionary biologists characterize benefits and costs not only in terms of a person's own genes, but the sum of any expected future progeny. They use the term extended fitness to encompass the reproductive value of one's relatives (appropriately weighted by r) in addition to one's own.2 Return to the example and imagine that 1 More technically, relatedness is can be thought of as the proportion of my genes that are identical by descent to those of my brother. The "by descent" qualifier distinguishes genes that are inherited from either the mother or father from those shared simply because they are common in the population (including, for instance, genes we might share with, say, chimpanzees). 2Just as economists use the term "utility" to denote well-being, but allow its exact arguments to (possibly) differ from one application to the next, so too biologists use the term "fitness" to denote reproductive success, but the specifics can likewise vary (de Jong, 1994 
Biology and Behavior
Before considering implications of Hamilton's rule for family behavior, note that biology and genetics do not obviate choice. True, some behaviors-yanking one's hand from a hot stove, say-might aptly be construed as "hardwired," but surely this is not the most useful way to think about spending for a child's education. Genes matter through the cascade they set into motion-the building of proteins, thus building bodies, which in turn cope with their habitat and the outside world. (What good is being hormonally primed for parental bonding if one is somehow prevented from holding one's newborn?) Biological causality ranges from distal to proximate, a parade of forces increasingly interactive with, and contingent upon, environmental conditions. Indeed, evolutionary thinkers have argued that intelligence and the capacity to choose are adaptations for coping with an ever-changing environment. Though evolutionary thinkers may be divided on certain details-for example, an evolutionary psychologist might envision that humans are saddled with outmoded "Stone Age brains," while a behavioral ecologist might highlight nimble strategies for optimal food foraging-they nonetheless would agree on the centrality of biologimplicitly define my fitness as the value of my own genes (normalized to 100 percent) plus the expected value of those genes that would be passed along to my progeny. My extended fitness equals my own fitness, plus 0.5 times the fitness of my brother(s). To keep the exposition simple and brief, I concentrate mostly on the biologists' maximand of extended fitness, rather than the economists' maximand of utility. For an excellent, nuanced discussion of how to bridge the two, see Bergstrom (1996). S Were my brother expected, in this two-period world, to have just one child rather than three, Hamilton's rule predicts refraining from heroism, since I could only save 75 percent of my genes. But now extend the horizon to three periods, and suppose also that my brother's one child is expected to produce four more of his own. In this instance, Hamilton's rule again predicts that my sacrifice can save 125 percent of my genes: 50 percent from my brother, 25 percent from his son, and 4 times 12.5 percent from his children. Note that, without some sort of discounting (say, by the probability of a child's surviving to reproduce) infinite dynasties can pose convergence problems for the biological maximand of extended fitness. Again, see Bergstrom (1996) for discussion of how to introduce economic realism, tractability, and generality to the extended fitness idea. ical forces such as sex, reproduction, and kinship for understanding families. Accordingly, economists could regard biological basics as a backdrop for thinking about gender or age-related inclinations, interests, and constraints, as illustrated by the applications below.
Age Asymmetries in Altruism
The earlier allusion to menopause is one illustration of the evolutionary insight that altruistic sentiments can have built-in generational asymmetries. All else equal, a post-menopausal grandmother is expected to be more altruistic toward her fertile granddaughter than vice versa. Kaplan (1994) 
Nepotism
Hamilton's rule predicts that, all else equal, the closer the genetic relatedness, the stronger is familial altruism. Evidence consistent with this appears in many forms-including the aforementioned experience of grief, which has been found to be more intensely felt at the loss of an identical twin, for whom r = 1.0, compared to a fraternal twin, whose r = 0.5 (Segal and Bouchard, 1993 headphones without having to be reminded! Despite ensuing arguments that circumscribed the theorem's generality (for example, Bergstrom 1989), its "don'tbite-the-hand-that-feeds-you" logic remains appealingly straightforward. It is therefore surprising that little empirical work has been done to test the implications of Becker's theorem against alternatives like that of Trivers (1974) .
A compelling testament to the power of Becker's (1974) theorem is human pregnancy itself, whose exacting tolerances (owing to the large-headedness of humans) threaten the viability of any "misbehaving" fetus that consumes too much and risks getting stuck in its mother's birth canal. That childbirth can happen at all is surely due in no small part to the fetuses' "behaving as if' they must respect the mother's interests. And yet there is recent evidence that the in utero application of the theorem does not always hold! Evolutionary biologist David Haig (1993) found that the fetus sometimes diverts more glucose to itself than its mother wants by secreting a hormone (via the placenta) that weakens the mother's insulin. Though the mother counters the secretions by upping her insulin production, the child sometimes gains extra fat at the expense of his mother, who then risks pregnancy complications as well as gestational diabetes.5
Sorting out when and why intergenerational relationships would go the way predicted by Becker (1974) , versus the way of Trivers (1974) , is to my mind a central priority for future research.
Uncertainty over Paternity and Investments in Children
Some economic studies of intergenerational transfers distinguish between maternal and paternal grandparents; others do not. The addition of the "spoke" of paternity uncertainty to the "hub" of Hamilton's rule provides a biological argument for doing so. Barring something like a mishap in the maternity ward, a mother can be certain her newborn is a genetic relative. But barring something equally extreme like the full-time sequestration of his mate, a husband might harbor a flicker of doubt." 5 There's more to the drama. In light of the risks noted above, it is puzzling that a fetus would "want" to risk growing overly large. Hrdy (1999) suggests that the fetus's demand for fat is derived from a desire to demonstrate viability, and Mann's (1992) study of maternal favoritism toward the heavier of pre-term fraternal twins lends support to this idea. Further, the complete story suggests another conflictbetween the father and the mother. The fetal "sugar grab" has been found to be an expression of paternal, not maternal, genes (Haig, 1993) . This is in line with expected costs of such a gambit, which presumably are lower for the father than the mother, since he doesn't have to directly incur the hazards and costs of pregnancy. 6 Attempts to gauge the extent of misattributed paternity are bound to be difficult (Birkhead, 2000) , and estimates in the literature vary widely from 1 to over 20 percent (Geary, 2005) . Such difficulties would only be compounded if, as evolutionary psychologists contend, paternity concerns that count most are those that prevailed in ancestral times. There is also no shortage of myth and legend surrounding cuckoldry (Cox, 2003) , which could prove important for behavior, since perceptions could matter more than population parameters. For example, ethnographies of the urban underclass reveal explicit concerns about paternity confidence among female relatives of putative fathers of babies born out of wedlock (for example, Anderson, 1993).
At the level of grandparents, the maternal grandmother is the only grandparent with complete certainty that she is related to the grandchildren. All else equal-and one can think of countervailing economic and cultural factors-"biological basics" imply a greater degree of altruism from the maternal grandmother than from the paternal one. This consideration accords with Duflo Of course, such raw differences could spring from many possible causes. Maternal grandmothers, for instance, tend to be younger and healthier than their paternal counterparts and thus better able to interact with and care for grandchildren. In Cox (forthcoming) I extend the NSFH descriptive analysis to a multivariate context, and find that the maternal/paternal differentials are indeed narrower after adjusting for these and other characteristics. I also consider partial correlations ostensibly implicated in paternity uncertainty, such as attitudes toward permanent monogamy (as reported privately, in self-enumerated questionnaires, by individual spouses). Intriguingly, such attitudes emerge statistically significant in but a single instance: the paternal grandmother's propensity to provide childcare was positively related to the wife's reported proclivity toward marital permanence. While such partial correlation is doubtless interpretable in several ways, it is, on the face of it, consistent with a biologically-based slant on marriage-namely, that marriage is an arrangement whereby potentially suspicious spouses monitor one another's fidelity. In this context, the link that would matter is the one between the paternal grandmother's childcare and her daughter-in-law's marital fidelity.
I hasten to add a caveat emptor to this interpretation: some other estimated partial correlations, such as those related to reports of attitudes toward a spouse's (hypothetical) infidelity, appeared to contradict the paternity-uncertainty hypothesis. Nonetheless, one advantage of the paternity-uncertainty approach, even at a descriptive level, is that it implicates variables that might not be otherwise singled out for consideration.
For instance, consider the Fragile Families data set, a survey of single mothers (and, in 75 percent of the cases, also the fathers) taken soon after the birth of the child. Both fathers and mothers were asked about the newborn's resemblance to parents and other relatives. In the second wave, conducted a year or more later, mothers were asked how many days during the previous month the non-co-resident father had spent with the child. There were large positive and significant differences by reported resemblance-but intriguingly, only for fathers of boys (Cox, forthcoming). Again, daunting problems can arise in inferring causality. Nonetheless, biological thinking helps to illuminate potentially pertinent, non-obvious behavioral pathways.7
Key "Biological Basics"-Sex and Reproduction Consider another reproductive "spoke" to append to Hamilton's rule: males and females differ vastly in the size and number of sex cells (gametes) they produce. Males produce abundant, cheap sperm at the rate of about 3,000 per second; women produce only about 400 viable eggs in an entire lifetime. More important, female mammals invest biologically more in creating new offspring than do males, and this is especially true for humans. Our extraordinarily large brains make childbirth far more dangerous and painful for humans than for other primates. Moreover, even full-term human newborns enter the world essentially 12 months premature, helpless, and needing much parental support, and women are biologically equipped to provide sustenance during that time.
Trivers (1972) was the first to argue that this sexual dimorphism in investment costs can create conflict over quality/quantity tradeoffs in fertility: mothers favor quality; fathers, quantity. This sex difference has potentially large implications for differing concerns and capabilities of men versus women in mating and childcare. Women can advance their genetic legacy by securing resources from their mate, friends, and family for supporting their offspring. While men also have an interest in investing in their children, they can also advance their extended fitness by securing additional mates.
Sex Differences in Mate Selection
Trivers (1972) emphasized the implications of sex-specific investment costs for patterns of sexual selection by gender. In humans, women are the intensive investors in offspring, and hence they are the scarce resource and the binding constraint. Thus, in Trivers's model, men compete for women. By dint of their minimal required investment, men can be prone to wanderlust and fecklessness. Further, polygyny (multiple female mates, either socially sanctioned or defacto) can sometimes emerge as an equilibrium mating system. There is both biological and survey evidence that proclivity toward polygyny lurks within the male psyche. Biological evidence comes from sex differences in size, with men weighing about 10 percent more on average. Biologists have found that, across species, the bigger this so-called sex dimorphism in size is, the more polygynous the species tends to be. They interpret the enormous size of, say, male elephant seals relative to their female counterparts as an adaptation that enables the males in this hyperpolygynous species to fight for and guard their enormous harems. Likewise (though to a lesser degree), the larger size and upper body strength of men is indicative of the male-on-male competition for mates in our evolutionary history. The 10 percent difference in human size by gender is modest compared to the 80 percent male-female weight advantage of our markedly polygynous primate cousins, the gorillas, but larger than another of our species cousins, the non-dimorphic gibbons, which are thought to be paragons of monogamy.
Survey Though only a fraction of socially sanctioned unions are indeed polygynous, biological basics can still imply marked female-male differences in searching for a long-term mate. Because females bear the biological burden of investment in a child, they risk abandonment by a ne'er-do-well who deposits his seed and then distances himself. Their challenge is to discover (possibly hidden) qualities of loyalty, commitment, responsibility, earning potential, and other traits in a mate that will help to assure that their genetic legacy receives long-term support. Biologically, males face a less difficult inference problem because correlates of reproductive potential in women are relatively straightforward to assess; the primary problem for men lies in attracting such mates.8
Of course, infidelity is not strictly a preoccupation of males, and there are biological incentives for-and physical evidence supportive of-certain kinds of human female infidelity too. The biologically based sex differences in quality/ quantity tradeoffs in reproduction suggest that female infidelity would be motivated by concerns for the provisioning of offspring (for example, Hrdy, 1999). For instance, the wife of "Steady Eddie" copulates with handsome "Fast Freddie," conceiving a son who inherits both Freddie's chiseled features and Eddie's financial support.9 8 A favorite classroom exercise of mine is to give undergraduates what I bill as the "easiest quiz in the world": guess the source of a list of titles from either Cosmopolitan, a women's magazine heavily devoted to issues of mating, or its male analog, Maxim. Cosmo articles like "Nine Weird Ways to Know This is the One," coach single women to keep an eye out for signals of commitment and competence (how he interacts with his nephews, pets, houseplants; evidence he's drawing a steady paycheck) whereas Maxim articles tout the joys of intrasex competition ("Beating People Up: An Awesome Fitness Regimen"). Could this be a social construction that in truth has nothing to do with biology? Perhaps, but I would want to see a cultural counterexample where the tenor of the articles is reversed. In a telling biological reversal, which accords with Trivers (1972) , the heavily investing male seahorse-which gestates the young in a special brood pouch-is the one that chooses among competing females. 0 Biological traits thought to be indicative of female infidelity are related to so-called "sperm competition," the idea that ejaculate volume evolves to compete with that of other males who might also have inseminated a desirable female (for example, Short and Balaban, 1994). The weight of human testes relative to body weight is larger than that of the gorilla (who instead protects his genetic interests by using physical strength to guard his harem), but much smaller than that of the chimpanzee (whose hyper-promiscuous mating style features rampant sperm competition).
Single women and men differ significantly in their valuations of certain traits possessed by a prospective mate: women tend to place earning capacity ahead of physical attractiveness; men rank them the other way around (Buss, 1989) . Not that men and women are expected to differ on all concerns: not many of either sex are likely to find misanthropy, stupidity, or visible evidence of infection wildly attractive. Indeed, Buss found that both males and females ranked kindness and intelligence at the top of desired characteristics in a long-term mate or marriage partner. But sex differences that did occur tended to accord with the Trivers (1972) model. Moreover, these were found to be consistent across a variety of cultures and locales (Buss, 1989) . Recent economic evidence from both a speed dating experiment (Fisman, Iyengar, Kamenica, and Simonson, 2006) and a study of on-line dating (Hitsch, Hortagsu, and Ariely, 2006) confirms these patterns. In the latter study, women cared more about a prospective mate's income, whereas men were more responsive to whether a posting had included a photo. Further, the evidence of Hitsch, Hortagsu, and Ariely (2006) is consistent with the idea of males competing for choosy females: women received five times more first-time email contacts than men on average; men were more likely to never be contacted or to have their approaches ignored.'0 While such patterns could in principle originate just from culture, to cast culture and biology as presumed alternatives (thereby ruling out that they might work together) risks an incomplete and perhaps over-simplified approach to sexbased differences in mating preferences.
Biology and the Economics of Marriage and Divorce
Sex-linked mating preferences and other exigencies of reproductive biology can readily be incorporated into models of matching, marriage, and divorce. For example, biological basics suggest that women might encounter more difficulty than men in predicting the long-term viability of a match-as well as have a stronger incentive for quickly ending one discovered to be nonviable. Recall that because of their larger parental investment, women are concerned with assessing difficult-tomeasure qualities such as loyalty, commitment, dependability, and future propensity to invest in offspring. Social conventions like gifts can help (Camerer, 1988) ; and they are also further evidence of sex differences in mating, since men, not women, typically use gifts like engagement rings to signal loyalty (Brinig, 1990) .
Considerations of the biological clock add time pressure to the inference problems women face. Women might prefer to initiate a seemingly viable match 10 Evolutionary psychologist Geoffrey Miller (1999) has conjectured that displays inherent in, say, artistic and athletic pursuits might be interpreted as advertisements of one's desirability as a mate. Such considerations, though clearly speculative, nonetheless suggest sex differences and age patterns in incentives to show off one's intelligence, fertility, physical prowess, wealth, or generosity. For instance, consider this Cosmo/Maxim question: Which magazine would be more likely to feature "How To Be Funny in Three Easy Steps"? How about: "What Someone's Sense of Humor Reveals"? despite lingering uncertainties, but likewise quickly terminate one that shows signs of not living up to its initial promise. The idea that reproductive concerns might figure into a wife's decision to end a marriage is supported by a study of 1.8 million divorces granted in England and Wales during the 1970s and 1980s (Buckle, Gallup Jr., and Rodd, 1996). Among spouses in their early 20s who petitioned for divorce, wives outnumbered husbands more than four to one, a disparity that steadily narrowed with the age of the party seeking divorce. (Among those 60 and older, for whom reproductive considerations are likely absent or negligible, there was parity between numbers of petitioning wives and husbands.)
Despite these large male-female differences, it is nonetheless conceivable that both spouses wanted the marriage to end, but that (in a last gasp of household division of labor!) the lower-earning spouse made the trip to the courthouse. However, in a sample of separations and divorces from the NSFH, Sweeney (2002) found that only one-quarter of the breakups were initiated mutually, with each spouse equally desirous of ending the union. Moreover, among spouses for whom one or another had the stronger desire to end the marriage, wives outnumbered husbands by more than two to one.
Biological considerations can also potentially illuminate the causes of divorce. In a cross-cultural study based upon ethnographic evidence from 186 societies, Betzig (1989) cited 54 in which wives'-but not husbands'-adultery was considered grounds for divorce, and only two societies where the reverse was true. (This, despite the male bias in adulterous leanings cited earlier.) One evolutionary-based explanation is the infamous double standard thought to emanate from differential severity of the consequences of a spouses' adultery for betrayed husbands (cuckoldry) versus consequences for betrayed wives (diversion of resources from own children). In contrast to the results for adultery, nearly all of the societies that cited "lack of economic support" as grounds for divorce stipulated that these grounds applied just to husbands.
Biological Basics and Women's Time Allocation
Surely one of the most impressive achievements in economics is the literature on labor supply, which even 25 years ago had already taken an exacting empirical approach to such conceptual subtleties as the distinction between the decision to work versus how much to work (Heckman, 1993 ). Yet even this sophisticated framework could not have anticipated the trends in women's allocation of nonmarket time: the studies reviewed in Cox (forthcoming) indicate that, as market opportunities for women rose, time spent in household chores fell much faster than time spent caring for children. Though time-saving technology is no doubt a factor, such an outcome emerges naturally from considerations of Hamilton's rule, which might be expected, with ever-tightening time budgets, to trump concerns about, say, clean floors or tidy lawns.
Men, Money, and Mating
Are wealth and status positively correlated with male reproductive success? For most traditional and early agricultural societies, the answer seems to be "yes" 
Conclusion
Steven Jay Gould (1978) memorably critiqued evolutionary-based explanations of behavior as little more than a collection of 'just so" stories, as in Rudyard Kipling's fanciful tales about how the elephant got its trunk, the leopard got its spots, and the giraffe got its long neck. Gould's underlying assertion is that plausible biological explanations could be invented to support any set of facts, and thus the overall approach was not testable. That critique is far too sweeping. The voluminous empirical literatures of evolutionary biology and its behavioral offshoots like human behavioral ecology and evolutionary psychology display a discipline that is heavily empirically based. Counter to the 'just-so" criticism, hypotheses like Trivers-Willard are clearly falsifiable, and in some cases have been demonstrably falsified (for example, Freese and Powell, 1999) .
Further, and also counter to the 'just-so" allegation, the evolutionary perspective clearly delineates phenomena that are puzzling-adoption of nonrelatives, for example, or care of indigent, frail elderly-versus those that can be explained. (Ad hoc patches can be concocted for those anomalies, but cogent explanations await.) Such delineation is precisely the task of any theory that aspires to progress; anomalies are what move us forward. Another hallmark of good theory is that it stimulates researchers to engage in creative new pursuits, something that biological basics, I believe, is bound to continue to do.
There 
